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The Influence of Gas-to-Liquids and Natural Gas Production Technology Penetration 
on the Crude Oil-Natural Gas Price Relationship 
David J. Ramberg*, Y.H. Henry Chen†, Sergey Paltsev‡ and John E. Parsons§ 
Abstract 
The paper examines conditions under which gas-to-liquids (GTL) technology penetration shifts the 
crude oil-natural gas price ratio. Technologies that enable direct substitution across fuels, as GTL 
does, may constrain the price ratio within certain bounds. We analyze the forecasted evolution of the 
crude oil-natural gas price ratio over the next several decades under alternative assumptions about 
the availability and cost of GTL and its natural gas feedstock. We do this using a computable general 
equilibrium model of the global economy with a focus on the refinery sector in the U.S. Absent GTL, a 
base case forecast of global economic growth over the next few decades produces dramatic increases 
in the oil-natural gas price ratio. This is because there is a more limited supply of low-cost crude oil 
resources than natural gas resources. The availability of GTL at conventional forecasts of cost and 
efficiency does not materially change the picture because it is too expensive to enhance direct 
competition between the two as fuels in the transportation sector. GTL only modulates the increasing 
oil-gas price ratio if both (i) natural gas is much cheaper to produce, and (ii) GTL is less costly and 
more efficient than conventional forecasts. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A tie between crude oil and natural gas prices has been documented by a number of researchers, 
including Serletis and Herbert (1999); Bachmeier and Griffin (2006); Asche et al. (2006); Villar 
and Joutz (2006); Brown and Yucel (2008); Hartley et al. (2008); Ramberg and Parsons (2012); 
Loungani and Matsumoto (2012); Brigida (2014).1 Many of these researchers attribute the tie to 
explicit competition between the fuels in key sectors—for example, Serletis and Herbert (1999); 
Pyrdol and Baron (2003); Asche et al. (2006); Villar and Joutz (2006); Brown and Yucel (2008); 
Hartley et al. (2008); Ramberg and Parsons (2012); Loungani and Matsumoto (2012). However, 
the linkage could arise in a number of ways, including the following: 
• Natural gas is discovered with crude oil in oil wells. This is a complementary linkage.  
• Natural gas is a feedstock to petroleum refining. This is another complementary linkage.  
• Natural gas and crude oil exploration compete for the same drilling rigs and labor. This is 
a competitive linkage.  
• Natural gas and petroleum-derived fuels are interchangeable in some industrial processes 
(such as dual-fuel boilers). This is another competitive linkage.  
• Natural gas and fuel oils compete for heating homes and buildings.  
• In some regions (such as Pakistan and Argentina), compressed natural gas is a significant 
 competitor to diesel or gasoline in transportation.  
• An apparent linkage can also arise if global economic growth translates into correlated 
price trajectories through time even in the absence of direct fuel-to-fuel linkages.   
Some have documented changes in the tie between the two price series and attributed that to 
changes in one or more of these linkages—see Serletis and Rangel-Ruiz (2004), among others. 
The empirical challenge in this literature is to filter out the influence of extremely short-term 
volatility in order to identify the longer-term relationship. The challenge is made harder when the 
underlying technological and economic factors shaping the relationship are also changing 
through time.  This paper studies the tie between oil and natural gas prices from a different 
perspective, modeling the underlying linkages and the evolving economic variables driving the 
two price series. We use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the global economy 
in which crude oil and natural gas resources are inputs to production in a number of different 
sectors feeding into a number of different end uses. We introduce a gas-to-liquids (GTL) 
technology that offers the potential for direct competition between the two fuels in the 
transportation sector. GTL converts a natural gas feedstock into liquid transportation fuels—
generally diesel—and petrochemical feedstocks (such as naphtha), thus creating an explicit 
                                                
1 Formally, the tie is cointegration of the time series of crude oil and natural gas prices. Two or more non-stationary 
data series are considered cointegrated when the relationship between them can be characterized by a single 
stable equation. A non-stationary data series is one in which the mean changes substantially depending on the 
subset of the series chosen. This is a common feature of time series data, and especially of commodity price 
series, in which the average price tends to drift upward or downward over time. 
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competitive linkage between natural gas and petroleum products in any sector that initially uses 
petrochemical feedstocks or diesel fuels. At different cost and efficiency levels, GTL should 
deploy to varying degrees, and its influence on the usage (and thus prices) of crude oil and 
natural gas can be tracked. Using our model, we analyze scenarios for the future price paths for 
the two fuels over several decades, and the ratio of the two prices along those paths, and we 
document whether the GTL technology significantly impacts that ratio.  
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses the research 
design and the base case scenario, Section 3 details results when GTL is introduced, Section 4 
reports results when factors affecting the feasibility of GTL are altered, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. RESEARCH DESIGN AND BASE CASE 
The set of indirect experiments utilizes the EPPA6-ROIL model developed at the MIT Joint 
Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change. EPPA6 is a CGE model that simulates the 
activities of 14 sectors (each producing a single commodity) and consumer demand over 18 
global regions. Interregional trade of each commodity is explicitly modeled (Chen et al., 2015). 
EPPA6-ROIL further breaks refined fuels into six different products. This allows for analysis of 
competition among distinct petroleum products, such as between gasoline and diesel fuels in 
transportation (Ramberg, 2015). It explicitly models changes in petroleum product fuel 
interactions in response to technological deployment. 
The data are aggregated from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) version 8 (Global 
Trade Analysis Project). EPPA6-ROIL disaggregates the refined oil commodity into refinery 
gases (RGAS), distillate fuels such as diesel (DISL), gasolines (GSLN), residual heavy fuel oils 
(HFOL), lubricants/waxes/petrochemical feedstocks (OTHP), and petroleum coke (COKE). 
Disaggregation of the refined oil product is based on the International Energy Agency’s (IEA’s) 
Energy Statistics and Balances and Energy Prices and Taxes databases, the Energy Information 
Administration’s (EIA’s) State Energy Data System (SEDS) database, and on the calibration data 
for the International Council for Clean Transportation’s (ICCT’s) Roadmap model (International 
Energy Agency, 2010a, 2008; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2014; International 
Council on Clean Transportation, 2012). The initial year for the model run is 2007. The full 
model is run from 2007 to 2010, then in 5-year intervals through 2100. 
We examine the relative prices of crude oil and natural gas that evolve in the simulation. The 
crude oil price is set by global markets, which reflect global aggregate supply and demand. The ease 
with which oil can be transported by sea, truck, or pipeline provides significant opportunities for 
arbitrage across regional markets. The result is that the crude oil price tends toward a single global 
price. Unlike the crude oil price, natural gas prices vary widely across regions. Natural gas transport 
is limited to costly pipelines, and markets tend to develop around regional transport hubs. In part 
because the natural gas price is regional, this study focuses on U.S. natural gas prices and the global 
crude oil price. The global crude oil price is compared to the U.S. natural gas price through a ratio.2 
                                                
2 Following industry conventions, the ratio is the crude oil price to the natural gas price, with the crude oil price measured 
in dollars per barrel ($/bbl) and the natural gas price measured in dollars per million British thermal units ($/mmBtu). 
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Petroleum products are nearly as easily transported as crude oil. However, region-specific fuel 
grades and emissions specifications make them less fungible than crude oil internationally. As  a 
result, petroleum product prices are also regional, though with less variation than natural gas prices. 
In the base case, GTL technology is not available for deployment. Subsequent simulations 
will set different cost and efficiency levels for GTL and different reserve levels and production 
costs for natural gas. We will then examine how differing levels of GTL penetration affect the 
crude oil-natural gas price relationship (if at all). In order to simplify the analysis, compressed 
natural gas (CNG), liquefied natural gas (LNG), and electric vehicle (EV) technologies are not 
included in the model. GTL is an easier drop-in technology than CNG, LNG, or EVs: the range 
of GTL-fueled vehicles is not limited and their acceleration is not inhibited, unlike CNG 
vehicles; EVs and LNG vehicles require complex infrastructure investments that complicate the 
modeling process. From a hedonic perspective, users will be indifferent about adopting GTL 
fuels because they are fungible with current diesel fuels and can be consumed in current diesel 
engines. GTL will thus be the only new route through which natural gas can compete with crude 
oil products in this simulation. 
The base case model run provides the reference to which all other cases are compared. It 
reveals key dynamics in the simulated global economy over the course of the 21st century. 
Figure 1 shows the crude oil price path for this base case scenario, as well as other scenarios to 
be discussed later. In the Base case (solid black circles) the crude oil price increases from about 
$71 per barrel (bbl) in 2007 to over $240/bbl in 2007 dollars by 2100. Figure 2 shows the U.S. 
natural gas price for all scenarios. In the Base case, the natural gas price increases from $6.75 per 
million Btu (mmBtu) in 2007 to about $7.75/mmBtu through 2035, then remains near that level 
for the remainder of the simulation.  
Figure 3 shows the ratio of crude oil to natural gas prices over the simulation for all scenarios. 
The oil-gas price ratio rose from over 10-to-1 to over 31-to-1 over the span of the base case. 
Crude oil prices steadily increased through 2100, ending over 240% above 2007 levels. U.S. 
natural gas prices rose until 2035, then stabilized at about 15% above 2007 levels through the 
end of the simulation. The quantities supplied of both fuels increased at similar rates through 
2100, although the increase is larger for natural gas. By the end of the century, natural gas 
demand had increased about 256%, and crude oil demand had increased by 133%. Natural gas 
consumption increased from about 69% of crude oil consumption in 2007 (measured in mmBtu) 
to about 103% of crude oil consumption in 2100, putting the consumption of both fuels roughly 
at parity by the end of the simulation. To illustrate sensitivity of the price to increases in demand: 
the global crude oil price increased by 1.8% for each 1% increase in usage, while natural gas 
prices only increased by 0.06% for each 1% increase in usage between 2007 and 2100. 
In the base case, the most rapid growth occurred in developing countries. As developing 
countries became wealthier, their demand for most goods and services increased. An exception was 
the growth in heating demand: most developing countries are in warmer regions, where heating 
demand (often served by natural gas) is weak. However, demand growth in other sectors followed 
increases in wealth. Demand for cooling and demand for private transportation both increased 
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Figure 1. World crude oil price ($/bbl): Base case and 3 scenarios 
 
Figure 2. U.S. domestic natural gas price ($/mmBtu): Base case and 3 scenarios 
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Figure 3. Crude oil / domestic natural gas price ratios ($/bbl / $/mmBtu) in the U.S.: Base case and 3 
scenarios 
substantially. These circumstances translated into rising demand for both crude oil and natural 
gas through time. 
The cost curves for natural gas are parameterized based on the data used in the MIT Future of 
Natural Gas study (Moniz et al., 2011). The cost curves for crude oil are based on the data in 
Chan et al. (2012). In 2007, crude oil production fell on a steeper part of the upward-sloping 
supply curve in comparison to natural gas. Over time, as crude oil production expanded, its cost 
of extraction—the resource cost—increased rapidly. In order to meet growing demand, more 
inputs of other factors of production (especially capital and labor) were required per unit of 
output. In 2007, cumulative production of natural gas put it on a relatively flat portion of its cost 
curve. Natural gas cost inputs remained fairly constant over the course of the simulation. In 
many regions, the production cost actually declined as the natural gas industry matured from its 
nascent stages into a well-established industry. 
The equilibrium quantities consumed and the prices of the two commodities reflect the interaction 
between the evolving supply and demand as mediated by the available production technologies. The 
sectors using natural gas typically also have alternative inputs available—for example, coal and 
natural gas compete as fuels to produce electricity. The transportation sector, however, is fueled 
almost exclusively with petroleum products refined from crude oil. Thus, the increase in 
transportation fuel demand translated directly to an increase in crude oil demand, but only a portion 
of the increase in electricity demand translated to an increase in natural gas demand. In sum, the lack 
of low-cost crude oil reserves, and the relative abundance of lower-cost natural gas reserves, made 
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production increases in crude oil more expensive than production increases in natural gas. However, 
crude oil use continued to increase because of the dominance of petroleum products in the 
transportation sector. The result is that crude oil prices rose more rapidly over time than natural gas 
prices, which moved very little. The oil-gas price ratio thus sloped dramatically upward. 
Other notable dynamics revealed in the base case are that distillate fuels tended to gradually 
make inroads against gasoline in agriculture and household transportation, and diesel eventually 
completely displaced gasoline in commercial transportation by 2100. Energy-intensive industry 
gradually shifted toward electricity (and, to a lesser extent, coal) at the expense of refinery gases. 
Electricity generation fuels shifted toward natural gas at the expense of coal, making natural gas 
the dominant fuel in the latter half of the base case simulation. The natural gas share of energy 
inputs to global oil refining increased from about 6% in 2007 to nearly 15% by 2100, displacing 
some crude oil. 
3. IMPACT OF GTL 
The first indirect experiment makes the GTL technology available and measures the extent to 
which it is deployed. We then examine whether GTL deployment has an impact on the crude 
oil-natural gas price relationship. There are a number of GTL technology formats under 
development. Most make diesel or other distillate fuels, but some make gasoline (Greene, 1999; 
Robertson, 1999; Knott, 2002; Cohn and Bromberg, 2011). Only the diesel/petrochemical 
feedstock versions have been proven economic—at least on a large scale (Simbeck and Wilhelm, 
2007; Hydrocarbons Technology, 2010b; Shell Global, 2011); the gasoline-producing version of 
the technology has not left the laboratory (Cohn and Bromberg, 2011). Since the gasoline-
producing version of GTL has never been deployed, we model the less costly diesel-producing 
version. It is assumed to produce a perfect substitute for petroleum-based diesel fuels and 
petrochemical feedstocks, with some more favorable emissions characteristics (Perego et al., 
2009; Delucchi, 1997; Greene, 1999; Schaberg et al., 1997; Martin et al., 1997; Wang and 
Huang, 1999; Schaberg et al., 2006). Under current technology, nearly 10 mmBtu of natural gas 
is required to produce an average barrel that is 70% diesel and 30% naphtha. This representative 
barrel contains about 5.5 mmBtu of energy, meaning that GTL is only 56% efficient. 
The base case GTL cost and efficiency data were compiled in Ramberg (2015). Central figures 
for capital cost, fixed and variable operations and maintenance (O&M), labor costs, and natural 
gas inputs per barrel of output were drawn from an array of studies and reports: Pintz (1997); 
Choi (1998); Greene (1999); Robertson (1999); Wang and Huang (1999); Wallace et al. (2001); 
Halstead (2006); Gary et al. (2007); Simbeck and Wilhelm (2007); Slaughter et al. (2007); 
Taylor et al. (2008); Hydrocarbons Technology (2010a,2010b); International Energy Agency 
(2010b); Rapier (2010); Bala-Gbogbo (2011); Lefebvre (2011); Liu et al. (2011); Shell Global 
(2011); Shaw (2012); Salehi et al. (2013); Atuanya (2014). These GTL parameters reflect a plant 
of the scale of the Shell Pearl GTL plant in Qatar: 120,000 barrels per day of output, of which 
70% are diesel fuels and 30% are petrochemical feedstocks. The key parameters are detailed in 
Table 1, along with the lowest and highest values encountered in the source literature. 
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Table 1. Key parameters of base case GTL plant 
 
 
An analysis of these key parameters using a discounted cash flow model reveals that the base 
case GTL plant would face a levelized cost of $42.39 per barrel produced before natural gas 
feedstock costs are taken into consideration. With a feedstock requirement of 9.85 mmBtu per 
barrel and $5.00/mmBtu natural gas prices, the levelized cost per barrel would be $91.64. At a 
natural gas price of $2.00/mmBtu, the levelized cost per barrel would be $62.09, and at 
$8.00/mmBtu, the levelized cost per barrel would be $121.19. As the price of natural gas 
increases, the ex-feedstock cost becomes less significant than the cost of natural gas. At a 
$2.00/mmBtu natural gas price, the barrel of output needs to be over 30 times more valuable than 
the mmBtu of natural gas for the GTL plant to break even. At a $5.00/mmBtu gas price, this ratio 
drops to about 18-to-1, and at $8.00/mmBtu of natural gas, the ratio drops to 15-to-1. 
In 2007, the natural gas price averaged $6.75/mmBtu. The diesel price averaged $49.89/bbl, 
and the petrochemical feedstock price averaged $102.60/bbl. The weighted price of a barrel of 
diesel/petrochemical feedstock output was thus $65.66. Under these conditions the base case 
GTL plant in the U.S. would have a levelized cost of $101.51/bbl—a loss of $35.85/bbl. The net 
present value (NPV) of the plant would have been -$9.96 billion if these prices were to hold over 
the 25-year lifetime of the plant. The internal rate of return (IRR) would have been 2%. Under 
the CGE calibration, output from a base case GTL plant operating in the U.S. costs about 72% 
more than producing the same products from a petroleum refinery. 
In the indirect experiment examining GTL penetration in the CGE model, GTL is made 
available only in the United States. The U.S. was chosen both because its shale gas resources 
have made it a consistent candidate for proposed GTL projects and also to simplify the analysis 
of  the effects of GTL penetration in a model with many interactions between and among regions 
and sectors. The focus on U.S.-based GTL deployment will permit examination of the rate at 
which the household transportation sector can shift from being predominantly gasoline-fueled to 
predominantly diesel-fueled.3 Such a shift is plausible because the higher cetane rating of GTL 
diesel puts it on par with gasoline in terms of performance (Sasol, 2011; Eudy et al., 2005; 
                                                
3 The United States is particularly well-suited for this analysis because it has a very well-developed household 
transportation sector and gasoline is firmly entrenched as its fuel of choice. 
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Greene, 1999). In addition, GTL diesel produces significantly less particulate matter, carbon 
monoxide, NOx and volatile organic compounds than ultra-low sulfur diesel (Delucchi, 1997; 
Greene, 1999; Schaberg et al., 1997; Martin et al., 1997; Wang and Huang, 1999; Five Winds 
International; Schaberg et al., 2006; Perego et al., 2009), which alleviates concerns about 
diesel-based pollution. Taking these factors into account it is reasonable to assume that diesel 
could penetrate as quickly as consumers replace their vehicles if the diesel price is sufficiently 
below the gasoline price. 
Initial calibration runs resulted in almost no GTL penetration. In order for GTL projects to be 
economic, three additional modifications were made to the base case model: first, restrictions on 
the rate of technological penetration were removed for GTL. This would allow the technology to 
immediately saturate the market to the extent that it is economic.4 Second, the global natural gas 
resource base was increased 100-fold, ensuring that resource constraints do not impede potential 
GTL penetration should it be initially economic. Third, the elasticity of substitution between the 
natural gas resource and other inputs to natural gas production was increased 6-fold. This 
increases the elasticity of natural gas supply and makes substituting the natural gas resource for 
other inputs, such as capital or labor, less expensive. The case is labeled HH,5 and it is plotted in 
red triangles in Figures 1, 2, and 3. 
In the simulation, GTL achieved limited penetration in 2070, with about 7,000 barrels per day 
of output—essentially the size of a large demonstration plant. By 2080 output increased to 
445,000 barrels per day, or the equivalent of less than 4 base case GTL plants. Subsequent 
capacity additions push total output to 2.6 million barrels per day (mmbd) by 2100. Total GTL 
output as a share of global refined fuel production did not exceed 1% until 2100. The impact on 
the trajectory of the oil-gas price ratio was negligible. 
The oil-gas price ratio rose from 10-to-1 to 38-to-1 over the course of the simulation. The 
difference from the base case was driven by the increase in natural gas resource levels. Natural 
gas prices peaked in 2040 at $7.15/mmBtu, then declined slightly, ending the simulation 7.6% 
below 2007 levels in the U.S. instead of stabilizing as in the base case. Crude oil prices steadily 
increased through 2100, ending over 230% above 2007 levels. Natural gas was able to substitute 
for crude oil products in limited activities, slightly dampening the increase in crude oil prices, 
but without increasing natural gas prices. In all, global crude oil consumption was about 3% 
below base case levels by 2100, and natural gas consumption was twice as high. 
These price shifts occurred despite the fact that natural gas never challenged crude oil in the 
transportation sector. Transportation sector demand growth expanded even more rapidly than 
under the base case, directly increasing crude oil demand with it. Natural gas displaced some 
electricity in the energy-intensive industry, other industry, services, food, dwellings, and final 
demand sectors. Natural gas accounted for over 50% of power generation in 2100, moving coal 
                                                
4 Essentially the “learning-by-doing” parameter limitation is being relaxed (Chen et al., 2015).  
5 The first “H” represents the base case natural gas production costs, which are the highest costs in the set of 
exercises. The second “H” represents the base case GTL costs, which are the highest costs and lowest efficiency 
settings modeled. 
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into second place. 25% of the crude oil feedstock inputs to oil refining were replaced by natural 
gas by 2100. In all, the growth in sectors that consumed natural gas caused the growth in natural 
gas demand to exceed the transportation sector-driven increase in crude oil demand. Part of this 
is because, with substantially expanded natural gas reserves, the HH case economy employed 
more natural gas in the activity of each sector, and part of it is because activity increased in 
sectors that use natural gas extensively. Overall, GDP and consumption were about 1% higher 
than in the base case by 2100 due to the insensitivity of natural gas prices to an increase in usage. 
The quantities supplied of both crude oil and natural gas increased steadily through 2100, but 
the quantity of natural gas consumed increased much more rapidly than crude oil. By the end  of 
the century, crude oil demand had increased by about 130%, but natural gas demand had 
increased by 645%. At the end of the simulation the world consumed 124% more natural gas 
than crude oil, reversing oil’s dominant position in 2007, when 45% more crude oil than natural 
gas was consumed. The price sensitivities to growth in demand also shifted from the base case: 
the global crude oil price increased by 1.8% with each 1% increase in demand, while natural gas 
prices fell 0.01% for every 1% increase in demand between 2007 and 2100. Despite the weak 
penetration of GTL, the HH case demonstrates that if the natural gas resource base were much 
higher than currently envisioned,6 natural gas usage could surpass crude oil usage within the 
century. 
4. STRESS TEST: WHEN DOES GTL MATTER? 
4.1 Low-cost natural gas production scenario (“LH”) 
GTL did not significantly penetrate in the HH case, which employed base case natural gas 
costs in conjunction with a massive increase in natural gas reserves. GTL penetration had an 
insignificant impact on the price paths of natural gas and crude oil products, and the crude 
oil-natural gas price ratio did not deviate from its prior trajectory. The two factors most relevant 
to GTL feasibility are the natural gas price and the amount of natural gas required to produce a 
barrel of output. This scenario will examine how a technology that reduces the cost of producing 
natural gas affects GTL deployment, and whether under these circumstances GTL technology 
deployment can impact the relative prices of crude oil and natural gas. This case is labeled LH,7 
and is represented by blue triangles in Figures 1, 2, and 3. 
The global deployment of a gas production technology (akin to hydraulic fracturing) cut 
natural gas production costs to 1/3 of the baseline in 2025, which lowered natural gas prices by 
over 60% after accounting for the corresponding increase in natural gas demand. The gas 
production technology deployment represented a downward shift in the natural gas supply curve; 
costs decreased for each level of quantity supplied. GTL was marginally profitable in the LH 
                                                
6 For example, if shale gas resources or ocean-floor methane hydrates were to be economically exploitable, natural 
gas reserves would no longer be a binding limitation to expansions of natural gas usage. 
7 In this case, the “L” refers to the low cost of natural gas production, and the “H” represents the base case (high) 
cost of GTL and its currently-estimated efficiency. 
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case, and initial deployment began in 2025 at 340,000 barrels per day, or about 0.3% of global 
refined oil production. GTL capacity expanded by 20-50% each period, but GTL capacity did not 
exceed 1% of global refined fuel production until 2055. That year GTL capacity was 2.2 
mmbd—the equivalent of just over 18 base case GTL plants. By 2100, GTL capacity had 
expanded to 16.3 mmbd, which was about 6.4% of global refining capacity. 
The low-cost natural gas production technology had an immediate impact on the crude 
oil-natural gas price ratio, but the penetration of GTL did not. The lower natural gas price pushed 
the crude oil-natural gas price ratio from 14-to-1 in 2020 to 39-to-1 in 2025. The low cost and 
high reserve levels dampened the increases in natural gas prices over time that were driven by 
global growth. Crude oil prices continued to rise. The result was a steeper price ratio curve, 
terminating in a 94-to-1 oil-gas price ratio by 2100. The gas production technology made natural 
gas comparatively less expensive. However, cheaper natural gas did not significantly increase 
competition between natural gas and crude oil. 
In the LH case, lower natural gas prices made gas more attractive in the sectors in which it 
competed. Global natural gas consumption doubled between 2020 and 2025. In the year the gas 
production technology deployed, global natural gas consumption was more than twice the base 
case level and was 80-90% higher than in the HH case. The trend increased over time as natural 
gas became more dominant in its competitive sectors. 
The shift toward natural gas usage occurred in industry, electric generation, food production, oil 
refining, services, dwellings and final demand. The shift was most pronounced in the latter two 
sectors. The effects of the low-cost gas technology deployment on the mix of fuel consumption in 
the final demand sector is depicted in Figure 4. The change in final demand is stark because final  
 
Figure 4. U.S. energy usage shares for final consumption at deployment of low-cost gas production 
technology in 2025: Base case and 3 scenarios 
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consumers used a narrow range of fuels and because natural gas competed directly with electricity 
for cooking, home, and water heating, and with fuel oil for home heating. A significant portion of 
stoves and home and water heaters could be replaced over a 5-year period at lower cost than, for 
example, the re-tooling of an industrial facility. The base case featured baseline natural gas costs 
and resource levels. The HH case featured baseline natural gas costs but greatly expanded natural 
gas reserves. Deployment of the low-cost natural gas production technology in the LH case cut 
natural gas prices by shifting down the natural gas supply curve. 
In the base and HH cases, final demand consumption shares were fairly equally divided 
between natural gas and electricity. In the LH case, over three quarters of final energy 
consumption was natural gas in 2025, when the natural gas production technology deployed. 
Final demand became increasingly dependent on natural gas over time. The rapid shift reflects 
the high level of substitutability in final consumption between natural gas and electricity. The 
shift over time reflected the drive to replace energy-consuming technologies from electricity to 
lower-cost natural gas, where possible (such as for heating and cooking). 
The electric generation sector shifted more gradually toward natural gas and away from coal 
because a large number of coal-fired power plants had not yet depreciated, coal plants are less 
expensive than gas plants to operate, and coal remained an inexpensive feedstock. However, 
even though natural gas displaced significant amounts of electricity in key sectors, the low cost 
of natural gas feedstocks nonetheless reduced the cost of electricity as well, and its use expanded 
by 10% beyond base case levels in 2025, rising to 35% above base case levels by 2100. The low 
cost of natural gas even caused a shift toward natural gas inputs at the expense of crude oil in the 
refined oil sector, with natural gas comprising 40% of total refinery inputs by 2100, versus crude 
oil inputs to refining of about 43%.8 
Despite this shift toward natural gas within oil refining, low-cost gas could not significantly 
displace crude oil products beyond the shifts that occurred in the HH case with the expanded 
resource base. Even with access to low-cost natural gas feedstocks, GTL technology in the LH 
case was not sufficiently competitive with oil refineries to significantly displace oil-based 
transportation fuels, so the crude oil price continued to rise with transportation demand. Despite 
considerable increases in natural gas usage, there was not enough opportunity for substitution 
between oil products and natural gas for interfuel competition to increase after a relative shift in 
prices. 
To affect the oil-gas price ratio, GTL penetration would have had to either increase natural  
gas prices or dampen price increases in crude oil by displacing its products. The penetration of 
GTL was not sufficient to pull natural gas prices up (see the blue triangles in Figure 2), nor did it 
displace enough petroleum products to significantly affect crude oil demand (or its price), as 
depicted in Figure 1. GTL deployment capped the U.S. distillate fuel price, but not enough 
distillate (diesel) fuels were available at a low enough price for significant substitution away  
                                                
8 This result is not surprising, either, since crude oil resources were much more costly than natural gas resources, 
prompting substitution away from crude oil wherever possible. 
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Figure 5. U.S. distillate fuel price ($/bbl): Base case and 3 scenarios 
from gasoline to occur in the household transportation sector. Figure 5 depicts the path of 
distillate fuel prices in every scenario. 
Because petroleum-sourced diesel remained dominant, crude oil consumption remained 
robust, and prices continued to steadily increase over the course of the simulation. It was only 
after 2070 that crude oil prices even deviated downward by 5% from the base case trend line, and 
oil prices were only 8% below base case levels in 2100. Global crude oil consumption was only 
about 9% below base case levels in 2100. This is because the substitution of crude oil with 
natural gas in refining was offset by overall increases in the demand for transportation fuels. The 
price sensitivity of crude oil was about +1.7% per 1% increase in quantity demanded from 2007 
to 2100. LH case natural gas consumption in 2100 was nearly 3.5 times the base case 
consumption. The natural gas price fell by 0.04% for every 1% increase in quantity demanded 
from 2007 to 2100 because of the low-cost gas production technology coming online in 2025. 
4.2 Low-cost natural gas production/low cost and highly efficient GTL scenario (“LL”) 
The HH scenario modeled base case GTL costs and efficiencies under greatly expanded natural 
gas reserves. The LH scenario modeled base case GTL costs and efficiencies in an environment of 
extremely low natural gas production costs and expanded natural gas reserves. Both cases showed 
an expansion of natural gas usage and incremental decreases in crude oil consumption where 
natural gas was able to displace crude oil or petroleum products. However, GTL was not 
sufficiently economic to allow natural gas to significantly compete with crude oil-derived fuels in 
the transportation sector in either case. The final scenario, labeled LL,9 maintains the expanded 
                                                
9 The first “L” denotes low-cost natural gas, and the second “L” denotes low-cost/high-efficiency GTL. 
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natural gas resource base and deploys the low-cost natural gas production technology as in the LH 
case, but also cuts the non-fuel input costs of GTL to a third of the baseline value and increases 
GTL efficiency to 100%: 5.5 mmBtu of feedstock produce the 5.5 mmBtu barrel of output. This is 
thermodynamically impossible, but it serves to define the upper bound at which GTL may 
compete with crude oil under the economic assumptions and mechanisms embedded in the CGE 
model. The LL case is represented by blue diamonds in all time-series figures. 
Natural gas usage in the LL case responds almost identically to the 2025 deployment of the 
low-cost natural gas production technology as in the LH case in the sectors in which natural gas 
is initially competitive. This is evident in Figure 4 for final demand. The response in dwellings, 
energy-intensive industry, electricity, food production, services, and oil refining is similar: 
natural gas initially makes inroads against the previously-dominant fuel in much the same 
manner as in the LH case. In sectors where petroleum products are not widely used, the trend in 
proportional fuel usage in the LL case is a close match to the LH case—these are final demand, 
dwellings, and services (where natural gas competes primarily with electricity), electricity 
(where natural gas competes primarily with coal), or energy-intensive industry (where natural 
gas competes with both coal and electricity). Where the LL case outcomes diverge from the LH 
case outcomes is in the sectors that use petroleum-based distillate fuels or petrochemical 
feedstocks—these are the outputs of GTL plants. 
The low-cost, high-efficiency GTL technology enables a more robust deployment when it first 
becomes available in 2020. Initial capacity is 3.3 mmbd, or about 2.9% of 2020 global refining 
capacity. When the low-cost natural gas technology deploys in 2025, GTL capacity nearly triples 
to 12.8 mmbd, or about 9.5% of global refined fuel capacity. This is the equivalent of building 
over 100 base-case GTL plants within the first decade. Capacity additions thereafter decline from 
about 37% in 2030 to settle in a 20% per-year average capacity increase through 2085. It is in 
2065 that GTL production first surpasses 20% of total refined fuel production. In Figure 3, 2065 
is also the date at which the crude oil-natural gas price ratio begins to flatten and deviate from 
the LH trend line. How the deployment of GTL eventually provokes a shift in the oil-gas price 
ratio is a combination of an initial shift in the supply curve, followed by movements along the 
crude oil and natural gas supply curves as demand adapts to the changing relative cost of fuel 
inputs to economic activity. 
At initial deployment, the LL case version of GTL produced distillate fuels at a cost slightly 
below that of oil refineries, as depicted in Figure 5 in 2020. However, the 2025 deployment of 
the low-cost natural gas production technology made distillate production through GTL 
particularly inexpensive. The combination of a low-cost, high-efficiency GTL technology and 
the low-cost natural gas production technology capped the cost of producing distillate (e.g., 
diesel) fuels 40% below the 2020 value, which is well below the oil refiners’ costs for distillate 
production. Furthermore, the cost remained flat in the LL case in contrast to the trend of rising 
prices in all other scenarios. There are thus two major differences in fuel prices from the base 
case: both the distillate fuel price and the natural gas price are much lower after 2025. 
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Non-transportation sectors that initially use transportation fuels or petrochemical feedstocks 
see substantial shifts toward GTL distillates and GTL petrochemical feedstocks beginning in 
2025. For example, the crop and livestock sectors initially shift toward GTL distillates from 
petroleum based fuels beginning in 2025. Over time, there are shifts from gasoline and refinery 
gases to GTL distillates as well, culminating in GTL distillate fuel dominance by 2100. The food 
production sector gradually displaces some of the natural gas inputs that initially displaced 
electricity with low-cost GTL distillate fuels as well. GTL petrochemical feedstocks displace 
substantial amounts of coal, petroleum-based petrochemical feedstocks, and heavy fuel oils in 
the forestry sector by 2100. 
The transportation sectors were affected by the penetration of cost-competitive GTL plants in 
the LL case. GTL was able to produce distillate fuels at costs far below oil refineries throughout 
the simulation; U.S. distillate prices were 40–70% below the global diesel price from 2025 
through 2100. Oil refinery operations did not initially change dramatically, because the bulk of 
oil refinery profits are from sales of distillate fuels and gasolines. Although refineries would no 
longer find distillate fuel production profitable, gasoline demand remained high, so refineries 
continued processing crude oil into refined fuels. 
Relatively inexpensive distillate fuels made diesel an attractive alternative to gasoline in the 
transportation sectors. This was especially true in household transportation, which was initially 
dominated by gasoline consumption. Figure 6 depicts the evolution of energy usage in U.S. 
household transportation as GTL distillate fuel production increased in the LL case.  
Initially, U.S. household transportation demand was met almost entirely by gasoline (see 
“Initial”, which was 2007). When the low-cost natural gas production technology deployed 
 
Figure 6. U.S. household transportation energy consumption shares in 2007, 2025, 2050, 2065, 2085, 
and 2100: LL case 
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(Low-cost gas (LCG)) in 2025, there had been only a slight shift toward GTL diesels. By the 
time the first wave of GTL plants had fully depreciated (LCG+25, in 2050), the gasoline share of 
energy consumption had fallen below 40%. By the start of the second shift in the oil-gas price 
ratio (Ratio Shift #2, in 2065), gasoline had been nearly completely displaced by petroleum and 
GTL distillate fuels. GTL diesel made up over 80% of energy consumption in household 
transportation. GTL diesel increasingly displaced petroleum diesel in household transport 
through 2100. 
The U.S. commercial transportation sector followed a similar pattern. Commercial transportation 
fuel consumption was about 75% diesel in the base year, with gasoline making up the bulk of the 
remainder. Figure 7 shows that by the time of the second price ratio shift in 2065, GTL diesels had 
replaced gasoline, and had nearly displaced petroleum-based diesel, in the LL case.  
Diesel gradually replaced gasoline in commercial transportation in all four cases. Even in the 
base case, diesel accounted for nearly 90% of commercial transportation fuel consumption by 
2065. However, the LL case is a clear outlier in its displacement of petroleum-based fuels, and in 
its effect on the oil refining sector: the low cost of GTL diesel made it increasingly attractive, 
and distillate production from oil refineries was uneconomic after 2025. However, oil refineries 
were not able to eliminate distillate fuel production because, depending on the grade of crude oil 
and the refinery configuration, fuels are produced in largely fixed proportions. By the second 
shift in the oil-gas price ratio, U.S. distillate prices were the lowest in the world—about 44% of 
the global average. The low costs of both distillate fuels and natural gas provoked strong rebound 
effects in the sectors that use those fuels. This is one reason that normal oil refinery production 
continued for so long in the LL case despite the superior economics of GTL plants: the additional 
 
Figure 7. U.S. commercial transportation energy consumption shares at the second major price ratio shift 
in 2065: Base case and 3 scenarios 
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demand was met almost entirely by expanding GTL production capacity. Global refinery 
production in the LL case tracked to within 1% (either above or below) the base case levels up 
until the second oil-gas price ratio shift in 2065. Figure 8 shows that U.S. refinery output tracked 
below base case levels, but never by more than 15% until 2065. This changed dramatically at the 
start of the second oil-gas price ratio shift. 
Demand for distillate fuels had exploded in the U.S. due to the rebound effect. However, the 
price of distillate fuels remained flat at any GTL-supplied quantity while crude oil prices continued 
to rise. For oil refineries, the rising cost of crude oil and the falling price of distillates made 
distillate fuel production unprofitable. Furthermore, by 2065 both gasoline and heavy fuel oils had 
also been displaced by the low-cost distillates or natural gas in most sectors. Faced with this loss of 
profitability, U.S. refiners sharply cut back on fuel production. By the time the trend in the oil-gas 
price ratio flattened, U.S. refinery output in the LL case was 65% below the base case, and 43% 
below 2007 output levels. Crude oil inputs to refinery operations were half of what they were in 
2060, just before the second oil-gas price ratio shift. The decrease in U.S. crude oil inputs 
weakened global crude oil demand. Figure 1 shows how these events affected the crude oil price. 
The stabilization of crude oil prices flattened the crude oil-natural gas price ratio at the end of 
the LL case time series in Figure 3. This was partially because the stagnation of crude oil 
consumption halted the advance of oil production up its marginal cost curve. Under the 
circumstances examined in the LL case, about 10% less crude oil is consumed in 2100 than 
under the base case. Movement along crude oil’s supply curve is arrested, and prices end up 
nearly 32% below base case levels in 2100. The price sensitivity between 2007 and 2100 is also 
lower, with crude oil prices increasing by just 1.2% for every 1% increase in quantity supplied. 
There is more than 16 times more natural gas consumed in 2100 than in 2007 in the LL case, and 
nearly 80% more natural gas is consumed in 2100 than in the base case. However, the low-cost 
 
Figure 8. U.S. refined oil sector output in million barrels per day (mmbd): Base case and 3 scenarios 
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gas production technology and expanded natural gas reserves prevent prices from rising after the 
2025 cut in production costs. The 2007–2100 price sensitivity is low: prices decrease by 0.04% for 
each 1% increase in quantity supplied. It is thus possible for GTL to compete with oil refineries to 
the extent that crude oil demand weakens and the crude oil-natural gas price ratio shifts downward. 
However, it can only do so under below-baseline natural gas costs, above normal assumptions 
about natural gas reserves, and lower-cost/higher-efficiency GTL configurations. 
4.2.1 Differences between the shifts in the oil-gas price ratios 
The first shift in the price ratio developed more rapidly than the second. This is not solely 
because the development of the GTL industry depended on lower-cost natural gas. The low-cost 
gas production technology operates at the wellhead. Decreasing the cost of natural gas 
production represents a downward shift in the supply curve. This translates into a fall in the 
natural gas price at each quantity supplied. Cutting the natural gas price directly results in an 
increase in the oil-gas price ratio. The technology does not create any additional linkages 
between sectors, but it does make natural gas more attractive in the sectors that already use 
natural gas. 
The market integration of GTL is more complex. GTL’s highest-value output is sold into the 
transportation fuels market, where oil refining is a dominant technology. GTL competes only if it 
can make transportation fuels at or below the cost of oil refineries. At the date of availability, oil 
refineries already have all of the capacity needed to cover all of the demand for transportation 
fuels. GTL enters the market by deploying to meet the incremental increases in transportation 
fuel demand. Investors must prefer to build a new GTL plant rather than a new oil refinery to 
meet increases in transportation fuel demand. Second, GTL makes diesel, which is only one of 
the major transportation fuels. Diesel is the dominant fuel in commercial transportation, but 
gasoline is the dominant fuel in private transportation. GTL must make diesel at a low enough 
cost that private consumers switch from gasoline to diesel when they make their next vehicle 
purchase. This process takes time. Eventually, enough consumption shifts away from gasoline 
and toward diesel that oil refiners lose their two most profitable products, and must cut 
production. This dampens global crude oil demand, and flattens its price. Once crude oil prices 
stop rising, the oil-gas price ratio stabilizes at the second shift. The GTL technology thus 
involves movements along the crude oil and natural gas supply curves as demand increases for 
distillate fuels in a shift away from gasoline over time. 
The effect of each technology on inter-fuel competition is distinct. The first shift in the oil-gas 
price ratio was the result of a technology that did not increase competition between crude oil and 
natural gas. It muted natural gas price increases, but did nothing to affect the unabated growth in 
crude oil prices. The result was a widening rift between crude oil and natural gas prices. The 
second shift was the result of GTL technology penetration, which increased competition between 
crude oil and natural gas through transportation fuel production. Eventually, GTL won enough 
market share to depress the increase in crude oil demand, which dampened its price increases. 
This stabilized the oil-gas price ratio over time. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
We use a computable general equilibrium model to examine conditions under which GTL 
technology penetration shifts the future crude oil-natural gas price ratio. Our results suggest that 
GTL penetration has an impact only under very extreme assumptions. Using conventional 
estimates of costs and efficiencies, the GTL technology is too expensive to enhance direct 
competition between the crude oil products and natural gas as fuels in the transportation sector, 
which is the critical sector for crude oil use and pricing. In addition to needing GTL to be less 
costly and more efficient in order to have an impact, it is also necessary for natural gas to be still 
cheaper to produce than the current shale revolution in the U.S. has realized. Our model results 
do not factor in any increasingly stringent global carbon limits, which would decrease further the 
prospects for GTL. 
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